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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-3881 
_____________ 
 
3039 B STREET ASSOCIATES, INC.; 
GIANNI BIGNETTI, President 3039 B Street Associates, Inc.,  
                                Appellants 
 
v. 
 
LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSLYVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01079) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 19, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 2 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 3039 B Street Associates (“B Street”) and Gianni Pignetti (“Pignetti”)1 appeal 
from the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment against them in this action seeking 
damages for the alleged bad faith of Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”) in 
investigating their insurance claim.  There being no evidence that would permit a jury to 
find by clear and convincing evidence that Lexington acted in bad faith, we will affirm. 
I.  Background 
A.  Facts 
 As we write exclusively for the parties, we recite only the essential facts, which are 
set forth more fully in the District Court‟s opinion.  On January 6, 2008, B Street 
discovered that a sprinkler pipe had ruptured in its property located at 3039-51 B Street in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, damaging both the property itself and some electrical 
equipment stored there.  B Street subsequently submitted a claim for insurance benefits to 
Lexington, its insurer. 
Lexington hired an independent adjustment firm, Crawford & Company 
(“Crawford”), to investigate and adjust the claim.  Among other things, Crawford sought 
to determine if B Street had maintained heat at the property, as the failure to do so would 
vitiate its rights under the policy.  Crawford was particularly concerned about this issue 
because many windows were broken, rendering it difficult to heat the property, and much 
                                                 
1
 In the materials before the Court, Pignetti‟s name is spelled both “Pignetti” and 
“Bignetti.”  Following the spelling used in Appellants‟ brief, we refer to “Pignetti.” 
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of the claimed water damage appeared to have been caused by water that had entered 
through these broken windows and pre-existing leaks in the roof.  (See App. at 273a, ¶ 
12). 
Crawford faced considerable difficulty in determining whether the property 
actually was heated.  When Crawford sought documentation that heating oil had been 
delivered to the property, for example, the last delivery that B Street could prove had 
taken place was on March 8, 2007, some ten months before the incident.  While Pignetti 
claimed that another company had delivered 2500 gallons of heating oil in the fall of 
2007, he could not name the company.  Crawford contacted the two companies that 
Pignetti said might have delivered the oil, but each denied that it had done so. 
Rather than produce satisfactory documentation, B Street suggested that Crawford 
contact its maintenance employee, Edgar Branch, who would state that the premises were 
heated at the time of the incident.  Although B Street first suggested that Crawford 
contact Branch on March 5, 2008, Branch was not contacted until his deposition on June 
5, 2009, at which time he testified that the property was always heated. 
 On July 7, 2009, Lexington decided that despite its concerns, it would not dispute 
coverage, and it mailed a check in the amount of $78,511.84. 
B.  Procedural History 
 B Street commenced suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on 
February 17, 2009, prior to Lexington‟s ultimate disposition of its claim.  Lexington 
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removed the suit to the District Court on March 10, 2009.  The Court granted Lexington‟s 
motion for summary judgment on May 4, 2010, and substantially denied B Street‟s 
motion for reconsideration on August 27, 2010. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court‟s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying “the same standard as the District Court in determining 
whether summary judgment was appropriate.”  United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle 
HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III.   Discussion 
 Although it is difficult to tell from B Street‟s briefing, its sole argument on appeal 
appears to be that Lexington acted in bad faith in violation of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371 by 
waiting over a year to contact Branch, i.e. that it should have paid the claim earlier.  (See 
B Street Br. 18 (“[T]he poor response time that is relevant to . . . the bad faith issue was 
the time it took LEXINGTON to contact Edgar Branch.”).2 
 “Ultimately, in order to recover on a bad faith claim, the insured must prove: (1) 
                                                 
2
 B Street also brought a claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act, 40 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1171.1, but it does not challenge the District Court‟s conclusion that that 
statute does not create a private right of action for bad faith for an insured against an 
insurer.   
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that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy; and 
(2) that the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in 
denying the claim.”  Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 137 (3d Cir. 2005).  
“The insured is required to meet its burden of proving „bad faith‟ by clear and convincing 
evidence,” and “mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Even where a claim is eventually paid, “[d]elay is a relevant 
factor in determining whether bad faith has occurred.”  Kosierowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
51 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
115 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Nevertheless, “Pennsylvania law provides that it is 
not bad faith to conduct a thorough investigation into a questionable claim.”  Babayan, 
430 F.3d at 138. 
 The undisputed summary judgment record shows that B Street‟s claim was highly 
questionable, and that Lexington, through Crawford, conducted a reasonable 
investigation.  Although Lexington ultimately decided not to contest coverage, (1) B 
Street could not provide documentation showing a recent oil delivery to the premises, (2) 
the property had numerous broken windows, such that it would have been difficult to heat 
it, and (3) while B Street claimed to have received a delivery of oil from another 
company, Pignetti could not recall the name of the company, and Crawford‟s attempts to 
confirm the delivery were unsuccessful.  It also bears noting that B Street was unable to 
demonstrate its ownership of the electrical supplies that it claimed were damaged by the 
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pipe rupture, further heightening Lexington‟s suspicion. 
 In light of these substantial problems with B Street‟s claim, its position — that 
Lexington should have simply taken Branch at his word and immediately paid the claim 
— cannot prevail as a matter of law.  B Street‟s claim was highly questionable, and 
“Pennsylvania law provides that it is not bad faith to conduct a thorough investigation 
into a questionable claim.”  Babayan, 430 F.3d at 138.  For this reason, the District Court 
correctly concluded that B Street would be unable to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that Lexington acted in bad faith.  It therefore properly granted summary 
judgment. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
 
